A Dynamic Model of the Firm: Structural Explanations of Key Empirical Findings by Lazzati, Natalia & Menichini, Amilcar A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2015-01-10
A Dynamic Model of the Firm: Structural
Explanations of Key Empirical Findings
Lazzati, Natalia
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/44905
A Dynamic Model of the Firm: Structural Explanations of Key Empirical Findings
Natalia Lazzati and Amilcar A. Menichiniy
January 10, 2015
Abstract
We derive a dynamic model of the rm in the spirit of the trade-o¤ theory of capital structure
that explains rm behavior in terms of rm characteristics. We show our model is consistent
with many important ndings about the cross-section of rms, including the negative relations
between protability and leverage, and between dividends and investment-cash ow sensitivities.
The model also explains the existence of zero-debt rms and their observed characteristics. These
results have been used to challenge the trade-o¤ theory and the assumption of perfect capital
markets. We revisit these critiques and provide structural explanations for the regularities we
replicate.
JEL Classications: G31, G32
Keywords: Dynamic model of the rm, trade-o¤ theory, zero-debt rms, investment-cash ow
sensitivity, dynamic programming
Corresponding author : Department of Economics, University of Michigan, 611 Tappan St., Ann Arbor, MI 48109-
1220; Phone: (734) 764-2355; Fax: (734) 764-2769; E-mail: nlazzati@umich.edu.
yGraduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, 555 Dyer Road, Monterey, CA 93943-
5000; Phone: (831) 656-2694; Fax: (831) 656-7633; E-mail: aamenich@nps.edu.




During the last decades, the empirical literature in corporate nance has reported a
few regularities regarding leverage, dividends, and investment decisions across rms. Some
of these ndings have been used to challenge the validity of central economic theories. For
instance, the negative relation between protability and leverage, which has been conrmed
by numerous studies, has been used to cast doubt on the trade-o¤ theory of capital structure,
and to support alternative, competing theories, such as the pecking order model of nancing
decisions.1 Another controversial result is the robust evidence of a negative association between
dividends and investment-cash ow sensitivities, often used to question the validity of the
perfect capital markets assumption.2 We construct a simple dynamic model of the rm in the
spirit of the trade-o¤ theory that can replicate these, as well as other, important empirical
ndings, in a unied way. We explain how rm behavior depends on rm characteristics and
how heterogeneity across rms can easily generate the empirical regularities we replicate. In
doing so, we revisit some of the doubts cast on the trade-o¤ theory as well as the functioning
of capital markets.
In our dynamic model, investment and leverage are the choice variables of the rm.3 In
each period, the rm receives a (mean-reverting) shock to prots and, to maximize share price,
it decides how much to invest for the next period, as well as how to nance that investment
1See, e.g., Fama and French (2002) for a discussion on this and other related issues.
2See, e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) for a detailed description of this result.
3The simple model we use in this article is sucient to reproduce several empirical results. For this reason, we
do not add cash holdings or rm exit.
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(i.e., with debt and/or equity). We initially assume the rm chooses the optimal level of debt
within the range of values in which it can be repaid in full with certainty. This condition aims
to capture the phenomenon of debt conservatism shown by Graham (2000) and allows us to
solve the model in closed-form. (We show in Section 4 that our results remain valid even if
we allow for risky debt.) We use Compustat data to calibrate the model parameters (e.g.,
volatility of prots, capital depreciation rate, etc.) for di¤erent SIC industries. We then use
the analytic model equations to simulate the evolution over time of the endogenous variables
of interest (e.g., leverage, dividends, protability, etc.) for representative rms in each of those
SIC industries. Finally, with the panel of rmschoices constructed from these simulations, we
run the regressions typically used in the empirical literature in corporate nance (e.g., pooled
ordinary least squares). We show that our model can replicate many regularities reported
by that literature and provide structural explanations for each of them.4 We explain why
we believe those ndings do not provide direct evidence against either the trade-o¤ theory or
the assumption of perfect capital markets. Furthermore, we use our model to motivate other,
more robust, observable implications that could challenge those theories.
We begin studying leverage and dividend decisions. The standard version of the trade-o¤
model predicts that more protable rms should have more leverage. The empirical evidence
shows almost unanimously that the opposite result holds in practice (e.g., Long and Malitz,
1985; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 2002). Hen-
4Furthermore, Lazzati and Menichini (2014a) use this model successfully for rm valuation. For instance, it
prices rms consistently and explains more than 70% of the cross-sectional variation in stock prices.
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nessy and Whited (2005) and Tserlukevich (2008) rationalize that negative association with
a dynamic model of the rm that features nancial transaction costs, and irreversibility and
xed costs of investments, respectively. We obtain the same result with a model that fea-
tures neither real nor nancial adjustment costs, thereby o¤ering an alternative justication.5
Briey, in our model, this result can be explained as follows: When leverage and invest-
ment decisions are simultaneously made, protability arises endogenously as a consequence of
those choices. Furthermore, we nd that the fundamental rm characteristics that have the
largest impact on book and market leverage (i.e., the curvature of the production function and
nondebt tax deductions) are the same features with the greatest e¤ect on protability.6 In
addition, the e¤ect of those characteristics on book and market leverage is opposite in sign to
that on protability. Then, rms with characteristics that make them highly protable tend
to have, at the same time, low book and market leverage and vice versa. When these rms are
pooled in a single regression, the negative coe¢ cient on protability naturally occurs, even
after controlling for other observable characteristics, such as market-to-book ratio, cash ow
volatility, etc.
Since we construct our model in the spirit of the trade-o¤ theory of nancing decisions, it
follows from our previous result that the observed negative relation between protability and
leverage is not direct evidence against that theory. This leads to a natural question: What are
we missing when we say the trade-o¤ model predicts that the opposite result should happen?
5We also nd that negative association with the risky debt model.
6The industrial organization literature in economics has extensively studied the elasticity of capital or curvature
of the production function (see, e.g., Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes, 2007, and the references therein).
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The standard trade-o¤ theory of capital structure was originally formulated assuming a xed
level of capital. When this is the case, rms that are in principle more protable have a greater
capacity to repay debt and should use more leverage to nance their assets. The model we
o¤er displays this feature. The problem of testing this assertion by using observed protability
is that protability depends on the optimal level of capital selected by the rm. Because rms
with dissimilar characteristics choose di¤erent capital levels, total assets vary across rms,
which violates the premise of a xed capital level in our initial observation. We believe that a
better way of testing this prediction in the cross-section would be by running a regression of
leverage on the economic characteristics of the rm that directly a¤ect protability (e.g., the
nondebt tax deductions, the income tax rate, etc.)
The model can also rationalize several other observed results about leverage and dividends
in the cross-section of rms (see, e.g., Fama and French, 2002). For instance, it has been shown
that corporations with higher dividend payouts are more protable and have less leverage.
Furthermore, rms with more investment opportunities (e.g., higher market-to-book ratio)
and higher volatility of prots have lower leverage and dividends. Finally, the empirical
evidence suggests that leverage is negatively associated with nondebt tax deductions. Our
results are consistent with all these observations. These results emerge with no agency costs
or asymmetric information problems, which are the usual assumptions invoked to justify most
of these relations. The former include Fama and Miller (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1976),
Myers (1977), Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen (1986), while the latter include Myers and
4
Majluf (1984). Thus, our work complements this literature.7
We close the study of leverage and dividend decisions by addressing one of the most
puzzling empirical ndings, that is, the existence of all-equity rms. Strebulaev and Yang
(2013) report that an average of around 10% of large public nonnancial U.S. rms have had
zero debt in the last decades. They also nd that those rms pay relatively higher taxes and
dividends, are more protable, and have higher market-to-book ratios. Furthermore, they sug-
gest that the existence of zero-leverage rms is independent of rm size. Our dynamic model
can replicate all these ndings, shedding light on this long-standing puzzle. The structural
explanation is that, in our model, rms with su¢ ciently high nondebt tax deductions have
zero leverage. In addition, rms with this characteristic turn out to be highly protable, have
high market-to-book ratios, and pay large dividends and taxes. Finally, because we obtain
these results under the normalization of the model parameter that regulates rm size (the
drift of the prot shock process), they hold irrespective of how large the rm is, as reported
by Strebulaev and Yang (2013).
We nally study investment decisions and the controversy around investment-cash ow
sensitivities. The latter refers to how strong rm investment responds to changes in its internal
cash ow over time. For instance, after periods of high net prots, a rm with high investment-
cash ow sensitivity would invest more aggressively (as a proportion of assets) than a rm
with low investment-cash ow sensitivity. If we regress investment on internal cash ow,
7The model developed by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) also predicts a negative association between leverage
and nondebt tax deductions.
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the regression coe¢ cient will be high (low) for rms with high (low) investment-cash ow
sensitivity.
One of the most prominent results is the empirical observation that rms perceived in
principle as more nancially constrained, exhibit stronger investment-cash ow sensitivities,
even after controlling for (some proxy of) marginal q. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)
suggest that this nding might be the result of substantial di¤erences in the cost of internal
versus external nance across rms. In this context, rms facing a larger wedge between the
two sources of funds may rely more on net prots to nance their assets. Therefore, these
rms should exhibit lower dividend payments and higher sensitivity of capital expenditures to
uctuations in internal cash ow. Our model can replicate this empirical nding in a context
where internal and external funds are perfect substitutes, that is, in a context where rms
face equal costs of internal and external funds (though, across rms, the cost of capital varies
according to their level of operating risk). We perform the usual regression of investment ratio
on internal cash ow and market-to-book ratio (the typical proxy for marginal q) separately for
each simulated rm, and nd that, indeed, the coe¢ cients on internal cash ow and market-
to-book ratio are signicantly positive in all those regressions.8 Most importantly, we nd
that rms that pay a smaller proportion of net income as dividends (i.e., the candidates to
be considered more nancially constrained) have larger investment-cash ow sensitivities, and
vice versa. We show this result occurs because rms with higher productivity of capital invest
more aggressively as a proportion of assets and, therefore, pay lower dividends on average.
8Gomes (2001) and Moyen (2004) also nd similar results using dynamic models of the rm.
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The negative relation between dividends and investment-cash ow sensitivities is then due
to di¤erences in investment opportunities across rms, as opposed to di¤erences in the costs
of internal and external funds though we acknowledge that the latter could indeed produce
similar results. In Subsection 4.2, we extend the model of the rm to include costly external
nance and the conclusions are the same.
2 A dynamic model of the rm
We use discrete-time, innite-horizon, stochastic dynamic programming to solve the
problem of the rm. Thus, the life horizon of the rm is innite and the CEO makes decisions
at the end of every period (e.g., quarter, year, etc.) to maximize the stock price. Our model
includes two fundamental features that enhance the existing dynamic programming models of
the rm in corporate nance. First, we introduce long-run growth, which could be interpreted
as the possibility of the rm to take advantage of new, protable investments in the future.
We write a tilde on X (i.e., eX) to indicate that the variable is growing over time. Second,
the model is based on the separation principle, which states managers maximize shareholders
wealth by undertaking the investments that maximize rm value, independently of equity-
holderspersonal preferences. Our model does not require any assumption about shareholders
utility functions, as long as we discount future cash ows with an appropriately risk-adjusted
discount rate.9 This feature makes the model a useful asset pricing tool.
9See, for example, Copeland, Weston, and Shastri (2005) for a more complete discussion of the separation
principle.
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The rm makes investment and nancing decisions in each period to maximize share
price. The book value of assets in period t is indicated by variable eKt. The capital of the
rm eKt is used for production and varies (i.e., increases or decreases) over time because of
investment decisions. Firm assets depreciate at constant rate  > 0 in each period. Variable
eDt represents the book value of debt in period t. We assume debt matures in one period and
is rolled over at the end of every period. As a means to simplify the analysis, we assume
the coupon rate cB equals the market cost of debt rB, which implies that the book value of
debt eDt equals the market value of debt eBt. The rm increases and decreases the amount
of outstanding debt eBt over time as needed to maximize the market value of equity. In the
spirit of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011), we initially assume the rm keeps debt
risk-free over its life, so that it can always repay its debt in full. This assumption helps to
rationalize the observation of debt conservatism reported by Graham (2000) and allows us
to obtain a closed-form solution for our model. The market cost of debt rB then equals the
risk-free interest rate rf . Section 4 shows our ndings do not change when we consider risky
debt.
There is one exogenous state variable that makes the model stochastic, the prot shock
zt. We assume prot shocks follow an AR(1) process in logs
ln (zt) = ln (c) +  ln (zt 1) + "t (1)
where the autoregressive parameter  2 (0; 1) denes the persistence of prot innovations.
When  is high, the periods of high prots (e.g., economic booms) and low prots (e.g.,
8
recessions) are longer on average, and vice versa. The innovation term "t is assumed to be an
iid normal random variable with mean 0 and variance 2. The drift in logs c > 0 scales the
moments of the distribution of zt and plays an important role in the expected prots of the
rm.10
Earnings before interest and taxes in period t are
eEt = (1 + g)t(1 ) zt eKt   f eKt    eKt (2)
where zt is the realization of the prot innovation in period t and parameter  2 (0; 1) repre-
sents the elasticity of capital or curvature of the production function. The factor (1 + g)t(1 )
can be interpreted as the level of technology available to the rm in period t and allows for
a normalization of growing variables that is required to solve the rm problem. This model
feature implies the rm can grow at constant rate g  0 in each period. The last two terms
of equation (2) are the nondebt tax deductions, and include the operating costs f eKt (with
f > 0) and capital depreciation  eKt of the period.
Taking into account the rm pays taxes on corporate earnings at rate  2 (0; 1), net
prots of the rm in period t are
eNt =  eEt   rf eBt (1  ) : (3)
Finally, the restriction (f + ) (1  )  1 guarantees the market value of equity is weakly
positive. We can then dene the accounting cash ow equation as
eLt = eNt   h eKt+1   eKt   eBt+1   eBti (4)
10It is common in the corporate nance literature to normalize parameter c to 1.
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which represents the dividend paid by the rm to shareholders in period t. This dividend
equals net prots minus the change in equity. We let rate rS represent the market cost of
equity and rate rA denote the market cost of capital. We assume that the secular growth rate
is lower than the market cost of capital (i.e., g < rA), which is needed to guarantee existence
of the market value of equity. Given the current state of the rm at t = 0,
 eK0; eB0; z0,
the CEO chooses an innite sequence of functions
n eKt+1; eBt+1o1
t=0
that maximize the market
value of equity. We solve this problem by using the Adjusted Present Value method developed
by Myers (1974). Letting E0 denote the expectation operator given information at t = 0 (i.e.,
eK0; eB0; z0), the stock price is then given by










subject to the restriction of risk-free debt. We dene debt as risk-free if, in every period, the
after-shock book value of equity is weakly positive. That is, net prots plus the value of assets,
eNt+ eKt, must be su¢ cient to cover debt, eBt. This condition is equivalent to a weakly positive
net-worth covenant and is often used with short-term debt contracts (see, e.g., Leland, 1994),
such as the one-period debt in the present model. In Section 4, we extend this model to
include risky debt as well as costly external nance.
The following proposition presents the analytic solution of the rm problem.
Proposition 1 The optimal decisions of the rm are given by
eKt+1 (zt) = (1 + g)t+1E [zt+1jzt] 11  W  and eBt+1 (zt) = ` eKt+1 (zt) (6)
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The optimal book leverage ratio is given by
` =
1  (f + ) (1  )
1 + rf (1  ) : (8)
The market value of equity is
eSt  eKt; eBt; zt = h(1 + g)t(1 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)+ eKt  eBt+fMt (zt)P  (9)
where function fMt (zt) can be expressed as
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The proof of Proposition 1 is in Lazzati and Menichini (2014a). We now describe its
di¤erent components.
Expression (6) shows how optimal next-period capital, eKt+1 (zt), depends on rm char-
acteristics. As expected, we observe that it decreases with the market cost of capital rA,
11
operating costs f , and depreciation . On the contrary, optimal assets increase with the
growth rate g, the drift parameter c, and the volatility of innovations  because they incre-
ment the expected productivity of capital via equation (2). While the e¤ect of  and  depends
on current prot shock zt, it is generally positive for standard values of the parameters. Ex-
pression (6) also shows that all these characteristics have the same directional e¤ects on the
optimal next-period debt, eBt+1 (zt). Finally, the income tax rate  has a negative e¤ect on
optimal assets as they become less protable. It also has a negative e¤ect on optimal debt for
the great majority of parameter values, including those used in the paper.
Graham and Harvey (2001) provide empirical evidence suggesting that most surveyed
rms actually have some form of target leverage. Our model incorporates this observation
and produces an optimal debt that is a constant proportion of optimal assets, with the factor
of proportionality given by ` in equation (8). This optimal ratio can be interpreted as the
target leverage of the rm, and reects the maximum book leverage consistent with risk-free
debt. It is readily veried that ` is strictly less than 1 and bounded below by zero, decreases
in nondebt tax deductions (i.e., operating costs f and depreciation ) and the market cost of
debt rf , and is an increasing function of the income tax rate  . These comparative statics
predictions conform with the testable implications of the model we provide.
Equation (9) shows the market value of equity, which represents an analytic solution of
the Gordon Growth Model in the dynamic and stochastic setting and can thereby be used
for valuation purposes (see, e.g., Lazzati and Menichini, 2014a). While the rst three terms
on the right-hand side of equation (9) represent the after-shock book value of equity, the last
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term is the going-concern value.
3 Structural explanations of key empirical ndings
The literature in corporate nance reports robust ndings regarding rm decisions. Our
dynamic model captures fundamental aspects of rm behavior and, thus, can rationalize many
of those critical observations in the cross-section of rms. The key step toward this achievement
is to explain how the endogenous variables depend on the di¤erent economic fundamentals of
the rm.
To facilitate the reading of the following subsections, we describe those endogenous
variables next.11 We dene book and market leverage in the usual way.
Book leverage: `bt =
eBteKt+ eNt and Market leverage: `mt = eBteBt+eSt( eKt; eBt;zt) :
We introduce dividend payout as dividends over capital and investment ratio as investment
over capital.
Dividend payout: dpt =
eLteKt+ eNt and Investment ratio: it = eKt (1 ) eKt 1eKt 1+ eNt 1 :
11To make our conclusions comparable with the existing empirical work, we match the denition of these variables
with the ones used by those studies. For instance, the leverage ratio ` in equation (8) represents the optimal
level of book leverage exactly after the rm makes the decision, but before the prot shock of the period is
realized. However, it is unlikely that Compustat captures that ideal situation. To the extent that Compustat
data are recorded at moments di¤erent from that of the decision, they will reect the partial or total realization
of the prot shock in the period. For this reason, we study the after-shock version of these variables.
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We let protability equal earnings before interest and taxes over capital, and dene internal
cash ow as net prots plus capital depreciation over assets.
Protability: pt =
eEteKt+ eNt and Internal cash ow: ht = eNt+ eKteKt+ eNt :
Finally, the market-to-book ratio is dened as the market value of assets over their book value,
and the tax ratio as the tax payment divided by capital.
Market-to-book ratio: qt =
eBt+eSt( eKt; eBt;zt)eKt+ eNt and Tax ratio:  rt = (
eEt rf eBt)eKt+ eNt :
Since all of the above variables are functions of the optimal policies, they are indeed
endogenous in our analysis. The relations between these variables and the primitive rm
characteristics cannot be described by simple inspection, as we did in the previous section
with the optimal policies. However, because these relations are at the heart of our structural
explanations, we provide a sensitivity analysis in the online appendix.12
3.1 Model predictions about leverage and dividends
One of the main results reported by the empirical capital structure literature is the
negative association between leverage and protability. This inverse relation usually appears
in pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of leverage ratios and is one of the most
persistent ndings in the cross-section of rms. It has been used to challenge the trade-o¤
theory of nancing decisions with the following argument: under that theory, more protable
rms should have more leverage, after controlling for other e¤ects, because they have a higher
12The online appendix can be found at: http://faculty.nps.edu/aamenich/Papers/Appendix_DDM.pdf
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chance of being able to repay the debt. We show that, as suggested in the introduction, our
model can rationalize this provocative nding. By linking the endogenous variables in our
model to the primitive characteristics of the rm, we provide a transparent justication for
that negative association.
To replicate the ndings, we rst simulate the behavior of a heterogeneous group of
rms (i.e., rms with di¤erent values of the economic fundamentals) and then use pooled
OLS regressions to study the associations between rm decisions and the other variables of
interest (e.g., protability and market-to-book ratio).13 We introduce rm heterogeneity into
our analysis by using three SIC industries that display considerably di¤erent curvature of the
production function and nondebt tax deductions, which we show in the online appendix are
among the most inuential rm characteristics. We select Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE)
as an industry with high capital elasticity and low nondebt tax deductions, Chemicals (C)
as an industry with an intermediate curvature of the production function and high nondebt
tax deductions, and Printing and Publishing (PP) as an industry with low capital elasticity
and intermediate levels of nondebt tax deductions. We compute the model parameters for
each industry using Compustat data and show their values in Table 1. Lazzati and Menichini
(2014b) describe the procedure used to obtain those parameters for each industry.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 2 exhibits summary statistics of relevant model variables for a representative rm
13We use pooled OLS because it is one of the most common tools employed by the empirical capital structure
literature to study the cross-section of rms.
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from each of the three industries.14 We obtain these results after simulating each industry
over 100,000 periods with the parameterization shown in Table 1.
[Insert Table 2 here]
We then use the last 100 observations from the simulation for each industry and do a
pooled OLS regression of book leverage to study the model predictions regarding the cross-
section of rms. For the regression, we use the standard specication
Yi;t = + Xi;t 1 + i;t (13)
where i indexes rms, t indexes time periods, Y denotes, alternatively, current values of
book leverage, market leverage, and dividend payout, and X is a vector of 1-period lagged
values of protability, market-to-book ratio, cash ow volatility, book leverage, and dividend
payout. (We compute cash ow volatility as the standard deviation of the last 10 periods of
protability.) Finally, i;t is an iid random term.
The results from estimating equation (13) for book leverage, as well as for market leverage
and dividend payout, are presented in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 here]
14Table 2 suggests that book leverage is above market leverage for the three industries. In the context of our
model, this di¤erence is due to the fact that the three industries we study (i.e., OGE, C, and PP) are quite
protable. This phenomenon occurs in our model because, in order to make it parsimonious, we did not
include some costs, e.g., capital adjustment costs or costs of external nance.
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Regarding the regression of book leverage, the coe¢ cient estimate on protability is
signicantly negative, which implies that more protable rms tend to have less leverage,
after controlling for other rm characteristics. This inverse association can be easily explained.
First, the online appendix shows that the parameters that have the largest impact on book
leverage, namely, the curvature of the production function () and the nondebt tax deductions
(f + ), are the same parameters with the greatest e¤ect on protability. Second, the impact
of those parameters on book leverage is of opposite sign to that on protability. Thus, in
a cross-section of rms subject to di¤erent values of the primitive features, the association
between leverage and protability will be negative.
The structural reasons underlying that cross-sectional negative relation are quite simple.
We dened protability (pt) in the previous subsection as the ratio of earnings before interest
and taxes
 eEt to (after-shock) capital  eKt + eNt. Equation (2) shows that earnings before
interest and taxes
 eEt diminish with the nondebt tax deductions (f + ), while equations (7)
and (3) show that capital
 eKt and net prots  eNt, respectively, also decrease with (f + ).
However, the overall e¤ect on protability (pt) turns out to be positive because earnings
before interest and taxes (i.e., the numerator of protability) diminishes less than (after-shock)
capital (i.e., the denominator of protability). For analogous reasons, the curvature of the
production function () has the opposite (i.e., negative) e¤ect on protability. Furthermore,
the directional e¤ect of those parameters on book leverage can be justied in the same way.15
15The online appendix contains a detailed description of the directional e¤ects of all the parameters on the
endogenous variables.
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Table 3 also shows that book leverage is negatively associated with market-to-book ratio,
cash ow volatility, and dividend payout. These results are also consistent with the empirical
ndings. As before, the elasticity of capital () and the nondebt tax deductions (f + ) are
among the most inuential parameters for the last three endogenous variables. Furthermore,
the e¤ect of these parameters on those three variables is opposite to the e¤ect on book leverage,
which generates the negative relation in a cross-section of rms.
The results about market leverage are displayed on the third column in Table 3, and are
similar to those of book leverage.16 The structural reasons behind these ndings are similar
as well, except that, for market leverage, other rm characteristics (e.g., the autoregressive
coe¢ cient () and the market discount rate of capital (rA)) also play an important role. The
last column of Table 3 shows the results for the dividend payout regression. The coe¢ cient on
protability is positive, implying that more protable rms tend to pay higher dividends. The
structural reason is that the curvature of the production function () and the nondebt tax
deductions (f + ) are the parameters with the strongest inuence on these two endogenous
variables and a¤ect them in the same direction. The dividend regression in Table 3 also shows
that market-to-book ratio, cash ow volatility, and book leverage have signicantly negative
coe¢ cients. Again, the underlying forces explaining these results are the opposite e¤ects of
the most inuential parameters on the variables of interest. Overall, the results in Table 3 are
16The low statistical signicance of the negative coe¢ cient on protability is due to collinearity between prof-
itability and dividend payout. Removing dividend payout from the regression makes the coe¢ cient on prof-
itability become signicantly negative.
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largely consistent with the empirical evidence.
3.2 On the existence of zero-leverage rms
The existence of large, protable, and stable rms that use zero debt is often hard
to explain in the context of the trade-o¤ theory of nancing decisions. According to that
theory, they could issue some debt to shield earnings from income taxes and, thus, increase
shareholders wealth. Strebulaev and Yang (2013) o¤er an in-depth study of zero-debt rms.
They report that in the last decades, on average, these rms comprise around 10% of large
public nonnancial U.S. rms. They also nd that those all-equity rms tend to be relatively
more protable, have higher market-to-book ratios, and pay higher taxes and dividends than
control rms. Furthermore, they suggest that this phenomenon is independent of rm size.
The dynamic model we o¤er, which is based on the trade-o¤ theory, is able to explain the
existence of all-equity rms as well as their observed characteristics.
Optimal leverage ` in equation (8) shows that zero-leverage rms will be those with
high nondebt tax deductions, net of the e¤ect of taxes (i.e., (f + ) (1  )). More speci-
cally, ` will be zero whenever (f + ) (1  )  1. (We restrict attention to the case where
(f + ) (1  ) = 1 to sustain the closed-form solution of our model.) We generate zero-
leverage decisions by simulating the behavior of rms with this characteristic. We select C
rms as the base case and change the values of f , , and  such that expression (f + ) (1  )
equals one. One parameterization that leads to this result is f = 1:10,  = 0:15, and  = 0:20.
Among the innite combinations of parameter values that lead to zero debt in our model, we
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selected one that is similar to the parameter values of a set of zero-debt rms in our data;
some of these rms belong to the C group. Table 1 shows the parameter values used for the
simulation of C rms as well as of all-equity rms.
We compare the simulation results for zero-debt rms to those of the base case C rms.
Table 1 shows that the latter have lower nondebt tax deductions, after the reduction by taxes
((f + ) (1  ) = 0:6384) than the former ((f + ) (1  ) = 1). Accordingly, Table 4 shows
that zero-debt rms have higher protability (49.03% vs. 41.51%), higher market-to-book
ratio (10.63 vs. 8.50), higher dividend payout (37.79% vs. 29.27%), and higher tax ratio
(9.91% vs. 9.36%) than C rms. Furthermore, because the drift in logs (c), which regulates
the size of the rm, has been normalized to 1, these results hold irrespective of rm size.
All these model predictions are consistent with the main ndings of Strebulaev and Yang
(2013). Overall, our results suggest that the existence of zero-debt rms is not a puzzle and
is consistent with shareholder value maximization (under the restriction of risk-free debt).
[Insert Table 4 here]
3.3 Model predictions about investments
The neoclassical inter-temporal model of investment predicts that marginal q should be
a su¢ cient statistic in investment regressions, that is, it should capture all relevant factors
a¤ecting investment decisions. However, a large body of research shows that prediction al-
most never holds, since di¤erent measures of internal funds (e.g., output, sales, and internal
cash ow) enter investment regressions as statistically signicant regressors with considerable
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explanatory power. With respect to internal funds, the sensitivity of investment seems to be
greater for those rms considered in principle to be more nancially constrained, even after
controlling for investment opportunities (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988). These
ndings challenge the validity of the assumption of perfect capital markets. Our model is
able to rationalize these empirical observations in a context where internal and external funds
are perfect substitutes. We estimate the corresponding investment regression with simulated
data and show that the coe¢ cient on internal cash ow is signicantly positive, even after
controlling for marginal q (using market-to-book ratio as the proxy). Most importantly, we
show that rms that pay fewer dividends (i.e., the candidates to be considered more nancially
constrained) have larger investment-cash ow sensitivities, and vice versa.
Table 2 shows the mean dividend ratio (i.e., the proportion of net prots paid out as
dividends) for the three SIC industries: OGE rms pay out a relatively low proportion of
net income as dividends (83.52%), while dividends in C and PP rms represent a relatively
high fraction of net prots (96.24% and 98.81%, respectively).17 Then, we do the following
standard investment regression
ij;t = + 1qj;t 1 + 2hj;t 1 + j;t (14)
where variables i, q, and h are the investment ratio, the market-to-book ratio, and the internal
cash ow, respectively, as dened at the beginning of this section. In addition, subindex j
17The dividend ratio equals dividends over net prots, i.e., drt =
eLteNt . Net prots, eNt, in the denominator is
frequently close to zero in numerical simulations, which produces extreme values of the ratio and heavy-tailed
numerical distributions. Therefore, we use the interquartile mean as a more robust measure of centrality.
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refers to rms, subindex t represents time periods, and j;t is an iid random shock.
We do the previous regression separately for each of the three types of rms and show the
results in Panel A of Table 5. Controlling for market-to-book ratio, we nd that the coe¢ cient
on internal cash ow is strongly positive in all investment regressions. This result is consistent
with the long-standing empirical evidence. Most importantly, the sensitivity of investment to
internal cash ow is considerably higher for low dividend rms (2 = 5:424 for OGE rms) as
compared to high dividend rms (2 = 2:288 for C rms and 2 = 3:162 for PP rms). This
nding is consistent with the evidence presented by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988),
but we obtain the result with a model in which rms have equal costs of internal and external
funds (though the cost of capital di¤ers across rms). The structural force behind our nding
is that the investment-cash ow sensitivity is strongly positively a¤ected by the curvature
of the production function (), while the opposite e¤ect holds for the dividend ratio. Thus,
rms with high elasticity of capital (e.g., OGE rms) will pay low dividends and exhibit high
investment-cash ow sensitivities, and vice versa. This is a clear model prediction about rm
behavior that is suitable for empirical testing. In addition, most of the other parameters
have an opposite e¤ect on those endogenous variables, reinforcing the inverse relation between
them.
[Insert Table 5 here]
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4 Extensions of the model
4.1 Risky debt
This subsection extends the model described in Section 2 to include the possibility to issue
risky debt. The risky debt model is identical to the risk-free debt model in all regards except
that it includes bankruptcy costs and a bankruptcy triggering event. Similar to Hennessy and
Whited (2007), we assume the bankruptcy costs in period t are given by  eKt, where  > 0
represents the proportion of assets that is lost in the event of bankruptcy. In this model,
bankruptcy occurs whenever

zt eKt   f eKt    eKt   rBt` eKt (1  ) + eKt   ` eKt < 0: (15)
That is, bankruptcy is triggered when the prot shock, zt, is such that the sum of net prots,
zt eKt   f eKt    eKt   rBt` eKt (1  ), and the value of assets, eKt, is insu¢ cient to cover debt,
` eKt. In this event, we assume the rm pays the bankruptcy costs and shuts down.
Another important feature of the risky debt model is the interest rate charged by debt-





(1  t+1) eDt+1  1 + rBt+1+ t+1 eRt+1jzti (16)
where the indicator function t equals 1 if the rm goes into bankruptcy in period t, and 0
otherwise. Variable eRt+1 is the amount of money received by the debt claimants in the case
of bankruptcy. Specically,
eRt = minn eDt; eKt + eNt   t eKto (17)
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which implies that bond-holders obtain the minimum between the nominal value of the debt
and the value of the assets in bankruptcy. Equation (16) means that debt claimants require
an interest rate that equates the nominal value of the debt to the expected discounted payo¤
of debt in the next period.18
With the previous assumptions, the stock price is given by










where eLt = eNt h eKt+1   eKt   eBt+1   eBti t eKt. Unfortunately, the expression above
does not have a closed-form solution, so we solve it numerically by backward induction.
We calibrate all previous model parameters as we described earlier. We follow Andrade
and Kaplan (1998) and calibrate the new parameter  such that it represents 20% of rm
value. We reproduce the leverage and dividend regressions described in Subsection 3.1. That
is, we regress current values of book leverage, market leverage, and dividend payout, on 1-
period lagged values of protability, market-to-book ratio, cash ow volatility, book leverage,
and dividend payout. We present our ndings in Table 6. It is apparent that the results from
these new regressions corroborate all our initial claims. Specically, all the coe¢ cients have
the same sign as before and exhibit similar levels of statistical signicance. In addition, the
estimates in our new model converge to the previous ones as we increase the cost of bankruptcy
. (The latter naturally happens as the two models are nested.)
[Insert Table 6 here]
18Following Moyen (2004) and Hennessy and Whited (2007), we are assuming that bond-holders are risk-neutral.
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Overall, we nd that the predictions of the risky debt model are similar to those of the
risk-free model. That is, leverage is negatively related to protability while dividends are
positively associated with protability in the cross-section of rms.
4.2 Risky debt and costly external nance
In Subsection 3.3, we showed that the investment-cash ow sensitivity depends mainly on
the curvature of the production function in a context where the costs of internal and external
funds are equal. We now relax this assumption by letting external funds (i.e., debt and equity
issuances) be more expensive than internal cash ows, and study its e¤ect on the investment-
cash ow sensitivities. To do this analysis, we extend the risky debt model described in the
previous subsection by adding a cost function of external nance.
Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) suggest that the costs of issuance are convex, both for debt
and equity. Accordingly, we use the following linear-quadratic cost function of external nance
eCt = d
264d1  eBt+1   eBt+ d2
 eBt+1   eBt2eBt
375+ e
264e1 eXt+1 + e2
 eXt+12eKt   eBt
375 (19)
where eXt+1 =  eKt+1   eKt    eBt+1   eBt   eNt represents the equity issuance in period
t. The indicator function d equals 1 if eBt+1   eBt > 0, and 0 otherwise. Likewise, the
indicator function e equals 1 if eXt+1 > 0, and 0 otherwise. This feature implies that issuing
debt and/or equity is costly, while reducing them is not. Parameters d1 and 
d
2 denote the
linear and quadratic costs of issuing debt, respectively, while parameters e1 and 
e
2 reect
the analogous costs for equity. Finally, we assume that the costs of external nance are tax
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deductible.
We calibrate the parameters in equation (19) following the evidence reported by Altinkilic
and Hansen (2000) and Hennessy and Whited (2007). Accordingly, we let d1 = 0:01, 
d
2 =
0:0002, e1 = 0:1, and 
e
2 = 0:0004, which reect the empirical observation that issuing equity
is more expensive than issuing debt. All other model parameters are calibrated as before. We
reproduce the regression in equation (14) and present the results in Panel B of Table 5. As
in Panel A, we nd that the investment-cash ow sensitivity is considerably higher for low
dividend rms (2 = 5:089 for OGE rms) as compared to high dividend rms (2 = 1:489
for C rms and 2 = 2:117 for PP rms).
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To conclude, our results suggest that the elasticity of capital is a major determinant of
the investment-cash ow sensitivities, even in the context of risky debt and costly external
nance.
5 Conclusion
The empirical side of the literature in corporate nance reports a series of regularities
regarding leverage, dividend, and investment decisions in the cross-section of rms. In turn, the
theoretical side of the literature rationalizes some of these observations with di¤erent models
(e.g., models of agency and asymmetric information) or assuming market imperfections (e.g.,
nancing constraints). We provide a dynamic model of the rm that is able to generate the
19We nd again that OGE rms pay a relatively low dividend ratio (80.76%), while C and PP rms pay a higher
dividend ratio (96.59% and 97.85%, respectively).
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main empirical regularities simultaneously and without assuming features such as agency costs
or frictions. The simplicity of our model allows us to describe how rm behavior depends on
rm characteristics. In particular, we show that the curvature of the production function and
the nondebt tax deductions are among the primitive features of the rm with the largest impact
on rm decisions. We show that heterogeneity across rms in the market can easily generate
the empirical regularities we replicate. Among others, our model can explain the observed
negative association of leverage with protability, the inverse relation between dividend ratios
and investment-cash ow sensitivities, as well as the existence of zero-debt rms and their
observed characteristics.
We believe the minimalist approach we employ in this article, making explicit the link
between the di¤erent economic fundamentals of the rm and the endogenous variables under
study, brings us closer to a unied framework that fully explains the cross-section of rm
decisions. Furthermore, it can also yield successful results to understand empirical ndings in
other areas of nance.
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The table presents the values used to parameterize the dynamic model for three di¤erent
SIC industries: Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE), Chemicals (C), and Printing and Publishing
(PP). The table shows the parameter values used to simulate zero-debt rms. The parameters
are the drift in logs (c), the persistence of prot shocks (), the standard deviation of the
innovation term (), the concavity of the production function (), the operating costs (f),
the capital depreciation rate (), the corporate income tax rate (), the market cost of debt




The table shows summary statistics from the simulation of the stationary distributions of
relevant model variables for three di¤erent SIC industries: Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE),
Chemicals (C), and Printing and Publishing (PP). The dynamic model is simulated over
100,000 periods for each industry with the parameterizations described in Table 1. The vari-
ables are optimal leverage (`), book leverage (`b), market leverage (`m), dividend payout (dp),
dividend ratio (dr), investment ratio (i), protability (p), internal cash ow (h), tax ratio ( r),
market-to-book ratio (q), and prot shock (z).
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Table 3
Leverage and dividend regressions
The table presents parameter estimates from pooled OLS regressions for a simulated sample of
three di¤erent SIC industries: Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE), Chemicals (C), and Printing and
Publishing (PP). The dynamic model is simulated over 100,000 periods for each industry with
the parameterizations described in Table 1. The regressions employ the last 100 observations













, while the regressors are protability (pi;t 1),













. The t-statistics appear in parentheses.
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Table 4
Summary statistics for zero-leverage rms
The table shows summary statistics from the simulation of the stationary distributions of
relevant model variables for zero-leverage rms. As benchmark, the table contains the corre-
sponding results for rms in the chemical industry (C Firms). The dynamic model is simulated
over 100,000 periods for both types of rms with the parameterizations described in Table 1.
The variables are optimal leverage (`), book leverage (`b), market leverage (`m), dividend
payout (dp), dividend ratio (dr), investment ratio (i), protability (p), internal cash ow (h),




The table presents parameter estimates from OLS regressions for a simulated sample of three
di¤erent SIC industries: Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE), Chemicals (C), and Printing and
Publishing (PP). In Panel A, the dynamic model does not include costs of external nance,
while in Panel B, the model features linear-quadratic costs of external nance. The dependent
variable is investment ratio (ij;t) while the regressors are market-to-book ratio (qj;t 1) and
internal cash ow (hj;t 1). The t-statistics appear in parentheses.
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Table 6
Leverage and dividend regressions with risky debt
The table presents parameter estimates from pooled OLS regressions for a simulated sample of
three di¤erent SIC industries: Oil and Gas Extraction (OGE), Chemicals (C), and Printing and
Publishing (PP). The dynamic model features risky debt and is simulated over 100,000 periods
for each industry with the parameterizations described in Table 1. The regressions employ the













, while the regressors are











. The t-statistics appear in parentheses.
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